Executive Summary — FY2021–TTM (Mar 2026)
Uber has moved from sustained losses through 2022 to durable GAAP profitability and rapidly expanding free cash flow — revenue grew from $17.5B to $52.0B (a ~31% CAGR), while free cash flow swung from a $743M outflow to $9.76B, and capital allocation has pivoted decisively toward buybacks.
Company & Reporting Information
Sources: stockanalysis.com/stocks/uber/financials, .../cash-flow-statement, .../ratios
01 — Financials
| Period | Revenue | Rev. Growth | Gross Profit | GPM | Operating Income | OPM | Net Income | NPM |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2021 | 17,455 | 56.70% | 8,104 | 46.43% | -3,834 | -21.97% | -533 | -3.05% |
| FY2022 | 31,877 | 82.62% | 12,218 | 38.33% | -1,832 | -5.75% | -9,245 | -29.00% |
| FY2023 | 37,281 | 16.95% | 14,824 | 39.76% | 1,110 | 2.98% | 2,108 | 5.65% |
| FY2024 | 43,978 | 17.96% | 17,327 | 39.40% | 2,799 | 6.36% | 9,883 | 22.47% |
| FY2025 | 52,017 | 18.28% | 20,679 | 39.75% | 5,565 | 10.70% | 10,146 | 19.51% |
| TTM | 53,687 | 18.30% | 22,028 | 41.03% | 6,260 | 11.66% | 8,661 | 16.13% |
Net Income includes minority interest, consistent with reported margin figures. TTM net income growth is negative YoY (-30.49%), mainly reflecting a large prior-year tax benefit rolling off rather than operating deterioration.
02 — Financials
| Period | CFO | CAPEX | FCF | FCF Growth | FCF Margin | Acquisitions | Buybacks | Dividends |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2021 | -445 | -298 | -743 | N/A | -4.26% | -2,314 | N/A | N/A |
| FY2022 | 642 | -252 | 390 | N/A | 1.22% | -59 | N/A | N/A |
| FY2023 | 3,585 | -223 | 3,362 | 762.05% | 9.02% | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| FY2024 | 7,137 | -242 | 6,895 | 105.09% | 15.68% | N/A | -1,252 | N/A |
| FY2025 | 10,099 | -336 | 9,763 | 41.59% | 18.77% | -815 | -6,523 | N/A |
| TTM | 10,126 | -327 | 9,799 | 0.37% | 18.25% | -821 | -7,749 | N/A |
Uber does not pay a dividend. Buybacks scaled from essentially nil through FY2023 to $6.5B in FY2025 and $7.7B TTM — now the dominant use of excess cash. Acquisition spend has been modest and episodic since the large FY2021 outlay.
03 — Trends
| Period | Revenue | Rev. Growth YoY | Free Cash Flow | FCF Growth YoY |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2021 | 17,455 | 56.70% | -743 | N/A |
| FY2022 | 31,877 | 82.62% | 390 | N/A |
| FY2023 | 37,281 | 16.95% | 3,362 | 762.05% |
| FY2024 | 43,978 | 17.96% | 6,895 | 105.09% |
| FY2025 | 52,017 | 18.28% | 9,763 | 41.59% |
| TTM | 53,687 | 18.30% | 9,799 | 0.37% |
FCF growth has decelerated sharply as the base has grown — from triple-digit growth off a small/negative base to near-flat TTM — while revenue growth has settled into a steady mid-to-high-teens band after the FY2021–2022 pandemic-recovery surge.
04 — Compounding
| Metric | Beginning (FY2021) | Ending (FY2025) | Periods | CAGR |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 17,455 | 52,017 | 4 | 31.39% |
| Free Cash Flow | -743 | 9,763 | 4 | N/M |
FCF CAGR is N/M because the FY2021 base is negative. For reference only (not a standard CAGR per the reporting rules): FCF grew from $390M (FY2022, first positive year) to $9,763M (FY2025) — roughly 25x over three years — illustrating the scale of the swing from cash-burning to strongly cash-generative.
05 — Market
| Period | Price | Market Cap | PE Ratio | Diluted EPS | Earnings Yield |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2021 | 41.93 | 81,735 | N/M | -0.29 | N/M |
| FY2022 | 24.73 | 49,596 | N/M | -4.65 | N/M |
| FY2023 | 61.57 | 127,520 | 70.77 | 0.87 | 1.41% |
| FY2024 | 60.32 | 127,152 | 13.23 | 4.56 | 7.56% |
| FY2025 | 81.71 | 168,969 | 17.27 | 4.73 | 5.79% |
| Current | 70.33 | 143,164 | 17.39 | 4.01 (TTM) | 5.97% |
At 17.39x, current PE sits just above the median (17.27x) and well below the average (33.76x, skewed upward by FY2023's inflated 70.77x reading, which reflected unusually thin earnings rather than a rich valuation). Relative to the two "normal-earnings" years (FY2024, FY2025), current valuation is roughly in line with FY2024 and modestly below FY2025.
06 — Synthesis
07 — Caveats
08 — Close
Uber's five-year financial arc is one of a business that has converted rapid, capital-intensive growth into a high-margin, cash-generative model: revenue nearly tripled, operating and net margins moved from deeply negative to solidly positive, and free cash flow went from a $743M outflow to nearly $9.8B. Growth has normalized into the high-teens range, and the capital allocation focus has shifted decisively to share repurchases. At a PE near the middle of its (short) history of profitable years, the stock does not appear expensive relative to its own recent trading range, though the earnings base still carries some volatility from non-operating items worth monitoring.